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This chapter does not deal with specific tools and techniques for managing complex
systems, but proposes some basic concepts that help us to think and speak about
complexity. We review classical thinking and its intrinsic drawbacks when dealing with
complexity. We then show how complexity forces us to take build models with
indeterminacy and unpredictability. However, we can still deal with the problems created in
this way by being adaptive, and profiting from a complex system’s capability for self-
organization, and the distributed intelligence this may produce.
1. Classical Thinking
The majority of scientific models—as well as much of our intuitive understanding—implicitly
rely on a “classical” or Cartesian mode of thinking, which is expressed most explicitly in the
classical or Newtonian mechanics that dominated the scientific worldview until the beginning
of the 20th century. It is based on the following assumptions (Heylighen, 1990):
• reductionism or analysis: to fully understand a system you should decompose it into its
constituent elements and their fundamental properties.
• determinism: every change can be represented as a trajectory of the system through (state)
space, i.e. a linear sequence of states, following fixed laws of nature. These laws
completely determine the trajectory towards the future (predictability) as well as towards
the past (reversibility).
• dualism: the ultimate constituents of any system are particles, i.e. structureless pieces of
matter (materialism). Since matter is already completely determined by mechanistic laws,
leaving no freedom for intervention or interpretation, the only way we can include human
agency in the theory is by introducing the independent category of mind
• correspondence theory of knowledge: through observation, an agent can in principle gather
complete knowledge about any system, creating an internal representation whose
components correspond to the components of the external system. This establishes a
single, true, objective mapping from the realm of matter (the system) to the realm of mind
(the representation).
• rationality: given such complete knowledge, in its interaction with the system an agent will
always choose the option that maximizes its utility function. Thus, the actions of mind
become as determined or predictable as the movements of matter.
These different assumptions are summarized by the principle of distinction conservation
(Heylighen, 1989, 1990): classical science begins by making as precise as possible distinctions
between the different components, properties and states of the system under observation.
These distinctions are assumed to be absolute and objective, i.e. the same for all observers.
They follow the principles of Aristotelian logic: a phenomenon belongs either to category A,
or to not A. It cannot be both, neither, in between, or “it depends”. The evolution of the
system conserves all these distinctions, as distinct initial states are necessarily mapped onto
distinct subsequent states, and vice-versa (causality, see (Heylighen, 1989)). Knowledge is
nothing more than another such distinction-conserving mapping from object to subject, while
action is a mapping back from subject to object.
Of course, we know that these assumptions represent ideal cases that are never realized
in practice. Yet, most educated people still tend to assume that a complete, deterministic
theory is an ideal worth striving for, and that the scientific method will lead us inexorably to
an ever closer approximation of such objective knowledge. The lessons from complexity
research point in a different direction, though.
2. Complexity
What is complexity ? Let us go back to the Latin root complexus, which means "entwined" or
"embraced". This can be interpreted in the following way: in order to have a complex you
need: 1) two or more distinct parts, 2) that are joined in such a way that it is difficult to
separate them. Here we find the basic duality between parts which are at the same time
distinct and connected. Therefore, the analytical method alone won’t allow us to understand a
complex, as by taking apart the components it will destroy their connections.
This means that using classical methods the behaviour of a complex system will be hard
to describe, explaining the connotation of “difficult” that the word “complex” has later
acquired. The components are mutually entangled, so that a change in one component will
propagate through a tissue of interactions to other components which in turn will affect even
further components, including the one that initially started the process. This makes the global
behaviour of the system very hard to track in terms of its elements. Unlike the simple,
“billiard-ball-like” systems studied by classical mechanics, complex systems are the rule
rather than the exception. Typical examples are a living cell, a society, an economy, an
ecosystem, the Internet, the weather, a brain, and a city. These all consist of numerous
elements whose interactions produce a global behavior that cannot be reduced to the behavior
of the separate coomponent.
Complexity is itself a complex concept, as we cannot make a unambiguous distinction
between simple and complex systems. Many measures of complexity have been proposed for
different contexts, such as computational, social, economic, biological, etc. (Edmonds, 2000).
However, there is no universal measure that would allow us to establish the degree of
complexity of an arbitrary system. Yet, within an agreed frame of reference, we can
sometimes compare two systems, noting that the one is more complex than the other. Thus,
complexity at best determines a partial ordering, not a quantitative measure. Overall, we can
say that the complexity of a system increases with the number of distinct components, the
number of connections between them, the complexities of the components, and the complexities
of the connections. This is a recursive definition that is general enough to be applied in
different contexts. For example, everything else being equal, a firm will be more complex than
another one if it has more divisions, if its divisions have more employees, if the divisions have
more channels of interaction, and/or if its channel of interactions involve more person-to-
person interactions.
While we do not really need an absolute measure of complexity, using such relative
comparison may be useful to indicate when it becomes necessary to abandon our simple,
classical assumptions and try to develop a more sophisticated model. Shifting from classical
to “complex” thinking brings both gains and losses. Let us start with the expectations we have
to abandon, and then point out some of the novel insights we gain.
3. Indeterminacy
Relinquishing classical thinking means giving up the principle of distinction conservation.
This implies, first, that we can no longer assume given, invariant distinctions: a distinction
made by one observer in one context may no longer be meaningful—or even possible—for
another observer or in another context.
This point was made most forcefully in quantum mechanics (Heylighen, 1990): in some
circumstances, an electron appears like a particle, in others like a wave. Yet, according to
classical thinking, particle and wave are mutually exclusive categories. In quantum mechanics,
on the other hand, the “particle” and “wave” aspects are complementary: they are jointly
necessary to characterize the electron, but they can never be seen together, since the
observation set-up necessary to distinguish “particle-like” properties is incompatible with the
one for “wave-like” properties. This was formulated by Heisenberg as the principle of
indeterminacy: the more precisely we distinguish the particle-like properties, the more
uncertain or indeterminate the wave-like properties become.
A more intuitive example of indeterminacy is the well-known ambiguous figure that
sometimes looks like a rabbit, sometimes like a duck. While both “gestalts” are equally
recognizable in the drawing, our perception—like a quantum observation set-up—is incapable
to see them simultaneously, and thus tends to switch back and forth between the two
interpretations. Complementary properties, like the rabbit and duck gestalts, are distinct yet
joined together. But while we see the one, we cannot see the other!
Because of the correspondence assumption, classical thinking tends to confuse what
things are and how we see or know them to be. Thus, observers have engaged in controversies
on “what things are”, while actually disagreeing on how to model or represent these
phenomena. When we speak about a phenomenon it is hard to specify whether we refer to
the representation or to the represented, because our language does not make such a
distinction, using the verb “to be” for both. To avoid such confusion we have proposed an
ontological distinction between “absolute being” and “relative being” (Gershenson, 2002). The
absolute being (abs-being) refers to what the thing actually is, independently of the observer
(Kant’s “Ding-an-sich”). The relative being (rel-being) refers to the properties of the thing as
distinguished by an observer within a context. Since the observer is finite and cannot gather
complete information, rel-beings are limited, whereas abs-beings have an unlimited number of
features. Therefore, there exists an infinity of potential rel-beings for any abs-being.
We can illustrate this abstract notion by imagining a sphere which is black on one
hemisphere and white on the other, as depicted in Fig. 1. Suppose we can observe the sphere
only from one perspective. For some, the sphere will (rel)be white, for others it will (rel)be
black, for others it will (rel)be half black and half white, and so on. How can we decide of
which colour the sphere (abs) is? Taking an average does not suffice, since it could be the case
that more than ninety percent of people see the sphere white, and we would conclude that it
is mostly white, while it actually (abs)is half white and half black. The best we can do is to
indicate the perspective (context) for which the sphere (rel)is of a particular colour. With real
systems, we will never reach their abs-being, because there are always more properties
(dimensions) than we are aware of. This task would be like determining the colour of an
infinite-dimensional sphere when you can only see one two-dimensional projection at a time.
Figure 1: the same black-and-white sphere seen from three different angles
With simple systems such as the 3-dimensional sphere, the number of rel-beings is
limited. However, complex systems have so many types of components and connections that
observers can have rel-beings that are so different that it may appear impossible to recognize
them as aspects of the same thing. For example, organizations have been described using
metaphors such as an organism, a machine, a brain, a community, a market, and a political
power game, and models such as a hierarchy, a network, and a linear input-output system.
For a classically thinking executive, this constant shift in models and concomitant
management styles is bewildering, as it seems that only one (or none) of these approaches can
be correct. Yet, an organization has both mechanistic and organic aspects, is simultaneously a
cooperative community and a competitive arena, a rule-bound system and an open, creative
environment, a hierarchy and a network...
There is no “best” model, as different rel-beings are appropriate for different contexts,
and different purposes (Beer, 1966; Heylighen, 1990). With a classical way of thinking, we
can spend all our efforts in trying to decide what is the system. Complex thinking, on the
other hand, allows us to contemplate different representations at the same time (e.g. by
proposing a metarepresentation (Heylighen, 1990)), in order to have a less-incomplete
understanding of the system. To tackle concrete problems, we can then choose the
representation that is most appropriate for that specific context, being well aware that a
different problem may require a radical shift in representation. For example, when tackling
internal conflicts it may be useful to see a firm as a network of interdependent communities;
when optimizing production, as a matter- and information-processing mechanism.
4. Non-linearity and chaos
According to classical thinking, distinctions are invariant not only over observers, but over
time. The principle of causality can be formulated as “equal causes have equal effects”, or
equivalently as “effects co-vary with their causes”. This is nothing more than a statement that
the distinctions between causes or initial states must necessarily carry through to their
effects, and vice-versa. While we may hold this principle to be true at the level of absolute
being, i.e. the complete things-in-themselves (microscopic causality, Heylighen, 1989), it is in
general not true at the level of relative being, i.e. the coarse, finite distinctions made by an
observer. Thus, microscopic causality (i.e. determinism) does not in itself produce
macroscopic causality  (i.e. predictability). This can be inferred most directly from the
existence of (deterministic) chaos, which follows from the non-linearity that characterizes
complex systems.
A system is linear if effects (outputs) are proportional to their causes (inputs). For
example, if you put twice as much ore in your furnaces, the plant will produce roughly twice
as much steel. This can be understood through the principle of conservation of energy and
matter: the amount that comes out depends directly on the amount you put in (though there
will of course be a few losses here and there). But what happens if (part of) the output is
redirected and added back to the input? In principle, the next output will be larger, since it
uses both the input and the previous output, and therefore no longer proportional to the
input alone. The next output will be even larger, as it uses not only the new input but the two
previous outputs. For example, a firm can reinvest some of the money it gets for its products
to increase production. Increasing production brings in more money and thus further increases
production, leading to an exponential growth in output.
Thus, non-linearity can be understood as the effect of a causal loop, where effects or
outputs are fed back into the causes or inputs of the process. Complex systems are
characterized by networks of such causal loops. In a complex, the interdependencies are such
that a component A will affect a component B, but B will in general also affect A, directly or
indirectly. A single feedback loop can be positive or negative. A positive feedback will
amplify any variation in A, making it grow exponentially. The result is that the tiniest,
microscopic difference between initial states can grow into an macroscopically observable
distinction.
This is called sensitive dependence on initial conditions, and is a defining feature of chaos.
Because the initial difference is too small to perceive, the principle of causality cannot help us
in predicting the final outcome. A well-known example of such a difficult-to-predict, chaotic
system is the weather, as the fluttering of a butterfly in Tokyo can grow into a hurricane
devastating New York. The observation that small causes can have large effects is obvious in
social systems as well. For example, during a tense negotiation the tiniest hint of a smile on
the lips of a CEO may create the impression with the other party that this guy is not to be
trusted, thus leading them to harden their stance, and finally reject a billion-dollar merger
operation. Such a system in a sense creates distinctions, as an indistinguishably small
difference in initial state leads to macroscopically distinct outcomes.
 The inverse of the amplifying effect of positive feedback is the dampening effect of
negative feedback. Here any variation is counter-acted or resisted, bringing the system back to
its equilibrium state. As a result large causes (variations) may have little or no effect. For
example, an entrenched culture in an organization can be very difficult to change, as new
measures are actively or passively resisted, ignored or deflected. Such a system destroys
distinctions, as distinct causes lead to the same outcome.
Complex systems will typically exhibit a tangle of interconnected positive and negative
feedback loops, where the effects of any change in a component cascade through an increasing
number of connected components, in part feeding back, positively and/or negatively, into the
initial component. If there is a variable time delay between these effects, it becomes in
principle impossible to make predictions, because we do not know who will affect who first
and thus whether an effect will be dampened before it has had the chance to get amplified or
not (cf. Gershenson et al., 2003). An example can be found in the stock exchange where
stocks are bought and sold depending on their price, while the price is determined by how
much is bought and sold. This intrinsic feedback loop has both negative and positive aspects.
The law of supply and demand implies a negative feedback, since an increase in price
normally reduces the demand, and this—after a variable delay—will reduce the price again.
However, the parallel mechanism of speculation entails a positive feedback, as an increasing
price makes buyers anticipate an even higher price in the future, thus enticing them to buy
more of the stock now. The interaction between both non-linear effects produces the chaotic
movement of stock prices that we know so well.
In the simpler situation where the delays are known (or can be neglected), it is sometimes
possible to get at least a qualitative estimate of what can happen by identifying the signs
(positive or negative) and the strengths of the different feedback loops in the network of
influences. This method, which is ofter used to build computer simulations, is developed in
the discipline of system dynamics (Sterman, 2000).
5. Adapting to Complexity
Given the intrinsic unpredictability of complex systems, how can we design, build or
generally deal with them? First we have to accept that we will never able to control or predict
their behavior completely. It is only natural that there will be surprises, errors and problems,
as there have always been. However, we can always try to cope with unexpected events by
adapting our actions to the new situation—if necessary reconfiguring the system without
destroying it. Different principles and methods for adaptation have been investigated in
cybernetics (Heylighen and Joslyn, 2001), artificial intelligence (Russell and Norvig, 1995),
neural networks (Rumelhart et al., 1986), multi-agent systems (Wooldridge, 2002; Schweitzer,
2003), genetic algorithms (Mitchell, 1998), chaos control (Chen and Yu, 2003), and many
other disciplines. Research is going on still, trying to design and build systems that are even
more adaptive.
To adapt to any change, whether anticipated or not, it suffices to compensate for any
perceived deviation of the actual situation from the desired course. This is the basic method of
feedback control: correcting errors after the fact (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001). If the reaction
comes quickly enough, before the problem has had the chance to grow, feedback-based
regulation can be extremely effective. The core innovation that engendered the field of
cybernetics was the observation that it does not matter how complicated the system of
factors and interactions that affect a variable that we wish to keep under control: as long we
have some means of counteracting the deviation, the underlying causality is irrelevant (Kelly,
1994). For example, it does not matter which complicated combination of social, political or
technological changes causes an economy to overheat: in general, the central bank can regulate
the rate of growth simply by increasing its interest rates.
Feedback control, however, still requires that we have a sufficiently broad repertoire of
counteractions at our disposal (requisite variety), and that we know which action to execute in
which circumstances (requisite knowledge) (Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001). The cybernetic law
of requisite variety notes that the greater the variety of perturbations that the system may be
subjected to, the larger the variety of actions it needs to remain in control. Since the number of
perturbations that a present-day organization may encounter is in practice unlimited, the
recommendation is for that organization to maximize the diversity of its possibilities for
intervention, as you can never predict what will be necessary when.
However, in order to react quickly and appropriately, it is good to have at least an
expectation of what may happen and which reaction would be appropriate. Expectations are
subjective probabilities that we learn from experience: the more often circumstance B appears
after circumstance A, or the more successful action B is in solving problem A, the stronger the
association A → B becomes. The next time we encounter A (or a circumstance similar to A),
we will be prepared, and more likely to react adequately. The simple ordering of options
according to the probability that they would be relevant immensely decreases the complexity
of decision-making (Heylighen, 1994). Thus, we do not need deterministic models or
predictions: having realistic default expectations with the possibility to correct for errors or
exceptions after they have appeared works pretty well in practice. Moreover, we can tackle
as yet unencountered combinations of circumstances by aggregating the recommendations
made by different learned associations in proportion to their strength, using the method of
spreading activation (Heylighen, 1999).
That is how our brains deal everyday with other complex systems: colleagues, children,
pets, computers, etc. However, much to our dismay and frustration, most designed systems
still lack this characteristic. For example, computers programmed according to rigid rules
cannot recover on their own when something goes wrong (Heylighen & Gershenson, 2003).
Organizations rarely have procedures to learn from experience, and those that do usually try
to store acquired knowledge as formal data rather than as a constantly evolving network of
associations between circumstances and actions. The only working paradigm to do this
outside the brain are neural network simulations, but these are usually limited to very
specialized applications such as hand writing recognition, rather than broad issues of
management and procedure. They are also extremely difficult to analyze. Yet, our research
suggests that these “brain-like” mechanisms are easily extended to the organizational level,
thus supporting an adaptive, collective intelligence (Heylighen, 1999).
6. Self-organization
While adaptation tells us how we may cope with complexity, we can also have the complex
systems work for us. Indeed, any dynamical system is in principle capable of self-
organization (Ashby, 1962; Heylighen, 2002; Heylighen & Gershenson, 2003), and the more
complex the system, the more “interesting” the results. We can define organization as
structure with function. Our definition of complexity already implies structure, which we see
as the combination of distinction (differentiation) and connection (integration). Function
means that the structure is developed to achieve some goal or purpose. The basic mechanism
of self-organization is that sooner or later dynamic systems evolve to an attractor of the
dynamics, i.e. a stable configuration of states, which the system can enter but not leave. We
can say that the components in this configuration have mutually adapted (Ashby, 1962),
limiting their interactions to those that allow this collective configuration to endure.
Thus, the “function” of this configuration is to survive, and the further behavior of the
system can be understood as supporting that function. For example, a firm will sooner or later
evolve its own culture consisting of a range of unwritten rules and preferences that constrain
the employees’ behavior. While “officially” the purpose of any rules may be to maximize the
productivity of the firm, in reality the function of this culture will be basically to maintain
itself. While self-maintenance implies a minimal level of productivity so that the firm does not
go bankrupt, attempts to further increase the workload may be resisted because they endanger
the social culture itself.
The advantage of self-organizing systems is that they search by themselves for solutions,
without the need for a manager or engineer intervening. Moreover, they are intrinsically open
and flexible: when unexpected changes come about, they can adapt seamlessly, without the
need for centralized control. The organization is distributed over all the participating
components and their connections. This means that the system is robust: it can survive
destruction of part of its components without too much damage, as the other components
make up for the lost functions.
Self-organization contradicts the classical way of thinking in several respects. To start
with, self-organization by definition cannot be reduced to independent components, as it
emerges wholly out of their interactions. Then, self-organization not only allows, but thrives
on, randomness or indeterminacy: the more perturbations or fluctuations the system
undergoes, the quicker it will reach an attractor, and the more stable the eventual attractor will
be. This is the order from noise principle (von Foerster, 1960; Heylighen, 2002). Of course,
too strong perturbations will destroy any organization, and therefore natural systems will
typically evolve to the "edge of chaos" where there is sufficient variation to make the system
creative and flexible, but not enough to make it wholly chaotic. Self-organization is a non-
linear process, since tiny perturbations can decide which out of two completely different
attractors the system enters, while once the attractor is reached, major perturbations will have
little or no effect. Most fundamentally, self-organization does not conserve distinctions: it not
only destroys the distinction between two initial states that end up in the same attractor,
while creating a distinction when the same initial state can end up in two different attractors;
it moreover creates and destroys distinctions at a higher level by integrating components in a
new coherent, organizationally “closed” system (Heylighen, 1991, 2002) that has novel
properties.
This is the phenomenon of emergence. Emergent properties characterize a system that
cannot be reduced to the sum of its parts. For example, the weight of a gas is the sum of the
weights of all the molecules in that gas. But the temperature and pressure of the gas simply
do not exist for a single molecule, as they measure the intensity of interactions between the
molecules. Gold is yellow, shiny, and malleable, but we cannot deduce these properties by
observing the atoms of gold (Anderson, 1972). We say that a cell is alive, but it is made of
non living elements.
We cannot fit emergence within a classical framework since it presupposes that things
can only be one thing at a time. If a cell is a collection of molecules and molecules are not
alive, then how could a cell be alive? We cannot speak about different levels of abstraction,
since classical thinking assumes that there is only one “true” representation. But in complex
thinking we can characterize the same abs-being at different levels using different rel-beings.
Then the mystery disappears, and we can speak comfortably about emergence. We can
understand it as a process that requires us to change our model of a system (Rosen, 1985;
Heylighen, 1991) in order to better understand and predict the system's behavior (Shalizi,
2001).
7. Distributed intelligence
Self-organization even deals a blow to the dualism of classical thinking, as it blurs the
distinction between matter and mind. Organization clearly cannot be reduced to the matter of
its elements, as the same organization can be implemented in different material substrates (e.g.
brains and computers), whereas an isolated particle of matter lacks any organization. But is
organization a form of mind?
Our definition as structure with function does include the apparently “mental” property
of goal-directedness. However, the fundamental insight of cybernetics is that goal-
directedness can be understood as a type of negative feedback loop which is can implemented
just as easily in mechanical systems, such as a thermostat or an automatic pilot, and in living
and cognitive systems, such as the brain. What allows us to model all of these in a similar way
is the concept of information, which has been defined by Bateson (1972) as “a difference that
makes a difference”. Whether this difference is carried by material objects, spoken language or
electrical impulses in the brain is in se irrelevant: what counts is in how far it helps the
system to understands its actual situation and take appropriate action so as to reach its
goal—in spite of constantly changing circumstances. Information is what reduces the
uncertainty as to the next thing that is going to happen or next action to take.
Self-organization can be seen as a spontaneous coordination of the interactions between
the components of the system, so as to maximize their synergy. This requires the
propagation and processing of information, as different components perceive different
aspects of the situation, while their shared goal requires this information to be integrated. The
resulting process is characterized by distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995): different
components participate in different ways to the overall gathering and processing of
information, thus collectively solving the problems posed by any perceived deviation
between the present situation and the desired situation. For example, the navigation of a large
ship, as investigated in detail by Hutchins (1995), requires the activity of several people in
different roles coordinated by means of formal and informal procedures, instruments, maps,
ship navigation manuals and a variety of communication channels.
Some of these “distributed” components are intelligent, cognitive agents, such as human
beings, but others are mere physical supports, such as notebooks, flip charts, or telephones,
that store and transmit information between the agents. From the cybernetic perspective,
there is no strict boundary between the “material” and the “mental” components: the
information stored in my notebook is as much a part of my memory as is the information
stored in my brain, and my email connection is as much part of my communication equipment
as are the nerves that control my speech. What counts is in how far the information carried by
each medium is under control, i.e. can be registered and transmitted as easily and reliably as
desired. Thus, for remembering appointments I may trust my notebook more than my brain,
and for explaining a complex task to a colleague I may rely more on an email message than on
a spoken explanation. Clark (1997) has called this perspective the philosophy of the extended
mind.
In the context of complexity, what counts is not whether we classify an information
medium as “mind” or as “matter”, but how we can ensure that this channel will pass on the
right information at the right time. Classical thinking is completely unhelpful in this respect,
since it assumes that in order to make rational decisions we simply need all information about
the system under consideration, since otherwise there is indeterminacy. The complexity
perspective notes not only that indeterminacy is unavoidable, but that having too much
information is as bad as having too little. Indeed, we only need the difference that makes a
difference with respect to our goals: what happens in the rest of the world is irrelevant, and
trying to include it in our models will only burden the very limited capacities we have for
information processing. In complex thinking, knowledge is a subjective model constructed to
make problem-solving as easy as possible, not an objective reflection of outside reality, and
decision-making aims for the solution that is good enough while using any opportunity to
improve it later, rather than for the optimal one that classical thinking presupposes. The crux
therefore is to be selective, and distil the essential difference from the infinite supply of data.
Happily, self-organization again comes to the rescue. An organization formed by a
collection of agents connected by a variety of communication channels will spontaneously
improve itself by learning from experience: communications that are effective will be used
more often, while those that are ineffective will be increasingly ignored. In that way,
information will be propagated ever more efficiently, filtering out the noise, while making sure
the right messages reach the right places. This learning happens simultaneously on the two
levels: “mentally”—when a person experiences that another person reacts either
appropriately or inappropriately to a particular type of message and thus becomes more
discriminative about whom to communicate with about what, and “materially”—when more
useful supports, such as a handbook or Internet connection, are made more accessible, while
inefficient ones, such as phone directory or fax machine, are relegated to the dust heap.
However, this distributed learning is still pretty slow and unreliable in typical organizations.
Applying the principles of self-organization and cybernetics (Heylighen, 1992, 2002;
Heylighen & Joslyn, 2001) may help us to design a much more effective organization.
Most concretely, we can build this self-organized learning into the very media rather than
have it be imposed on them by the users. For example, when employees are bombarded every
day with email messages from colleagues and departments, it would be helpful to prioritize
these automatically, so that the most important messages—such as a request for an urgent
meeting with the CEO—are attended to immediately, while the less important ones—such as
the latest offerings at the company canteen—are classified at the bottom of the heap, where
they can be attended to if there is time, but otherwise safely ignored. This ordering by
priority is something that the communication system could learn from experience, by
observing which kinds of messages tend to be attended to most actively by which employees.
A slightly more sophisticated version of the system would also learn the typical workflow
and division of labor in an organization, making sure that the right task is sent to the right
person at the right moment. Our research group is presently investigating through computer
simulation how a group of agents using various communication media can self-organize so as
to achieve such coordination (Crowston, 2003) between their activities .
8. Conclusion
We still do not understand complexity very well, and there is much to be done and explored in
this direction. Our culture now is immersed and surrounded by complexity. But facing this
complexity forces us to change our ways of thinking (Heylighen, 1991). We have shown how
classical thinking, with its emphasis on analysis, predictability and objectivity, breaks down
when confronted with complex systems. The core problem is that classical philosophy
assumes invariant, conserved distinctions, whereas complex systems are entangled in such a
way that their components and properties can no longer be separated or distinguished
absolutely. Moreover, because of the inherent non-linearity or “loopiness” of the system,
they tend  to change in a chaotic, unpredictable way. At best, we can make context-dependent
distinctions and use them to build a partial model, useful for a particular purpose. But such
model will never be able to capture all essential properties of the system, and a novel context
will in general require a different model.
This chapter did not so much propose specific tools and techniques for managing
complex systems, as this would require a much more extensive discussion. Moreover,
introductions to and reviews of existing concepts are available elsewhere (e.g. Kelly, 1994;
Heylighen, 1997; Battram, 2002). Instead we have brought forth a number of ideas that allow
us to better understand and speak about complex systems. First, we must be aware that
complex systems are never completely predictable, even if we know how they function. We
should be prepared to deal with the unexpected events that complexity most certainly will
bring forth, by as quickly as possible correcting any deviation from our planned course of
action. To achieve this kind of error-based regulation we should not try to predict or
determine the behaviour of a complex system, but to expect the most probable possibilities.
This will make it easier for us to adapt when things go off-course. Because then we are ready
to expect the unexpected.
Yet, complexity does not just make our life harder. By better understanding the
mechanism of self-organization, we may make a complex system work for us. This we could
do by preparing the conditions so that self-organization is stimulated in a way that fits with
our desires. We may even make use of, and stimulate, the inherent intelligence that
characterizes a self-organizing system. By stimulating people as well as media to interact and
learn from their interactions we may foster a distributed form of information-processing that
coordinates the different activities in the system.
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